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Abstract 
The ECB has the ultimate responsibility for the single monetary policy. The ECB‟s goal is 
maintaining price stability over the medium term; this means ensuring inflation stays in the 
region of 2 percent. If some EMU members are more favoured by the ECB‟s interest rate 
decisions then this would cause implicit problems and overall, the monetary union would face 
problems regarding structural divergences between member countries. These divergent 
problems would make each country differ from each other with regard to inflation and GDP 
growth. Thus the ECB has the difficult task of deciding a single interest rate that fits all 
member countries. Calculations based on interest rates versus forecasts on output gaps and 
inflation do illustrate a pattern that shows that some countries are more favoured by interest 
rate decisions than others. This poses a crucial question as to whether all countries benefit 
from membership in the monetary union and, by extrapolation, does the ECB as an institution 
have enough power to execute pivotal monetary politics? 
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1. Introduction 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) has been in operation for a decade. The union has 
been under heavy scrutiny, and some members of the European Union (EU) still have not 
ratified their obligations to become members in the EMU. One main reason these countries 
have given to not join the EMU is because monetary policy decisions are centralized at the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB and its three decision-making bodies have the 
ultimate responsible for the single monetary policies and the joint interest rates. These interest 
rate decisions were intended to treat all member countries equally but the effects as to how 
well the decisions fit each EMU country are different. The Treaty on the European Union 
entrusts the monetary policy to the ECB and the institutional framework for the single 
monetary policy ensures that the central bank is independent from political influence.
1
 
However, there is significant evidence that the Governing Council of the ECB is, in fact, 
affected by national needs and desires, which, ultimately, could affect those interest rate 
decisions.
2
 Economic theory and empirical data illustrates that the interest rate is highly 
correlated with economic development and inflation. In particular, interest rates and output 
gaps have co-varied over time for the Eurozone.
3
 In order to see if some member states in the 
EMU are more favoured than others by the interest rate decisions taken by the ECB we will 
look at economic forecasts and key interest rates for the period from 2000 to 2009. If there are 
indications that some member countries are more favored by the interest rate policy then what 
would this imply for the EMU and the countries that are under the single monetary policy? 
The question is an important one to investigate because, if it is true that some states are more 
favoured, meaning some states are not favoured or does not fit the Eurozone monetary 
framework, then not only will these countries face problems, but, that in turn, means greater 
difficulties for the ECB. These difficulties include: a restricted ability to stabilize the member 
countries‟ economies, the ECB‟s reactions to boosts and recessions would be ineffective, 
inflationary differences may arise due to structural divergence problems within the union, and 
the EMU countries‟ relative competiveness could decline due to increasing costs and different 
real interest rates. Ultimately, all of these problems could induce countries to leave the 
monetary union.
4
 
                                               
1 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p.13. 
2 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 184-186. 
3 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p. 10. 
4 IBID, p. 14, 17. 
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1.1 Problem formulation and study objectives  
The question outlined in this bachelor‟s essay is formulated as follows, “Are some EMU 
members more favoured by the ECB‟s interest rate decisions than others?” The question is 
rather straightforward and simply asks whether the interest rate decisions made by the ECB 
favour some of the European Monetary Union‟s member states more than others, which might 
imply that the ECB looks at and form their interest rate decisions around certain member 
state‟s economic performances. The countries who are not favoured then suffer economically 
because significant problems and disadvantages arise. In order to be able to answer the 
question stated above we need to examine forecasts of economic performance, such as output 
gap and inflation growth, for all the EMU member states and compare these with interest rate 
decisions made by the ECB. An econometric analysis of the data is not included because 
individual analysis and calculation of the data is sufficient to establish any patterns.  
 
1.2 Purpose 
There are many reasons to choose to write a bachelor‟s essay within the macro field and with 
a special focus on the EMU, the ECB, and its interest rate decisions. First and foremost, 
macroeconomics and economic politics is crucial because such decisions affect all corners of 
society. The European Union and the ECB lies within this main focus because many countries 
in Europe, (even Sweden although not yet a member of the monetary union), are affected by 
the union‟s policy decisions. The complexity a single monetary union implies is interesting to 
unravel and the task to examine whether interest rate decisions favours some member states, 
is challenging. Also, the EU and the EMU is a broad and much explored research field with 
ample authorship. This essay attempts to both evaluate the main research concerning the EU 
and to draw conclusions as to whether countries benefit from the single monetary policy. This 
becomes an obvious problem if countries do not benefit equally by the monetary policies and 
that in turn could imply that policy changes are necessary to correct any inequalities. 
However, the main goal of this essay is not to negate the work of the ECB. The focus is only 
to investigate if some countries are in fact favoured by the interest rate decisions and what 
economic consequences this might cause. It should also be emphasized that much of the 
information that describes the work of the ECB is gathered from publications made by the 
ECB itself. This could be critiqued as the ECB may be biased in their description of their 
work, although, other writers and views are presented when it comes to defining the problems 
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within the ECB and the single monetary policy which shed light on whether ECB‟s work in 
fact is operating as stated or not.      
 
1.2.1 Previous research 
Other research in the same field suggests that the EMU and its single monetary policy is 
biased and does not favour all countries equally. Paul de Grauwe, and his writings in “The 
Eurozone: Problems and prospects” implies that the Eurozone has significant divergence 
problems and that the single monetary policy does not fit all. However, he has not 
investigated which countries that are favoured and how this has varied over time for the 
Eurozone as a whole. Moons and Van Poek have also examined whether the single monetary 
policy fits all countries equally well, and their research in “Does one size fit all? A Taylor-rule 
based analysis of monetary policy for current and future EMU members”, suggests that the 
ECB's policy does not fit individual EMU members equally well, and that addition of new 
member states will not change this. This thesis‟ focus on which countries benefit from the 
monetary policy; and the findings thus sheds light and contributes to a part of the research 
field that has not been much explored.  
 
1.3 Delimitations 
Some difficulties were encountered when writing this essay in finding appropriate data on 
economic performance for each member country, and for the Eurozone as a whole for the 
entire time period. In order to use appropriate data for forecasts on output gap and inflation, 
we are forced to exclude all interest rate decisions made in 1999 and interest rate decisions 
made 4 February and 7 March in 2000 due to a lack of available data on forecasts of output 
gaps for these dates. However this has no significant effect on the results and conclusions 
made in the analysis: there is enough substantial data on the other interest rate decisions made 
up until 13 May 2009. Another issue in assessing the data was how to handle interest rate 
decisions made by the ECB that resulted in no change or no new stance (and was not 
presented in the key interest rate table 1 on page 23). These were not included in the 
following calculations on interest rates, output gaps, and inflation, but nevertheless they have 
to be considered because no change in the interest rate remains a decision that ultimately 
affects the EMU member countries.    
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1.4 Outline 
The essay is divided into three sections: an introduction to the ECB, a quantitative data 
analysis, (which includes a comparative analysis) and, a conclusion. The introduction to the 
ECB looks at the design and objectives of the ECB and its single monetary policy, and is 
important in order to understand the work of the ECB and any potential problems. The data 
analysis and calculations are presented in the quantitative section. The final section will try to 
answer the outlined problem.    
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The chart illustrates the three decision-making bodies of the ECB which all have different 
responsibilities. The Executive Board and the Governing Council are the main decision-making 
bodies of the ECB. 
2. Introduction to the ECB  
The Treaty on the European Union was signed in Maastricht on the 7th February 1992. 
Among other things, it stipulates that monetary policy is entrusted to the Euro system.
5
 The 
Euro system consists of the European Central Bank and the national central banks (NCBs) of 
all the countries who joined the EMU
6
. Today, there are 16 such NCBs. The ECB consists of 
two decision-making bodies: the Governing Council and the Executive Board. These two 
bodies are responsible for the preparation, conduct, and implementation of the single 
monetary policy. The General Council is the third decision-making body of the ECB. Figure 1 
below illustrates the decision-making bodies of the ECB. 
Figure 1. The decision-making body of the ECB
7
 
 
 
The Executive Board of the ECB consists of the President, Vice-President, and four other 
                                               
5 The European Central Bank (2007), How the euro became our money. A short history of the Euro banknotes 
and coins. 
6 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 181. 
7 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, Chart 1.1, p. 10. 
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members. They are all selected by the head of state and governments of the Euro area 
countries and their main duties include: convening meetings of the Governing Council, 
implementing monetary policy, and overall responsibility for the current business of the ECB. 
The Governing Council of the ECB consists of the six members of the Executive Board and 
the sixteen governors of the member countries‟ NCBs. The responsibilities of the Governing 
Council are primarily to formulate the monetary policy of the Euro area and to adopt the 
guidelines entrusted to the Euro system. The last decision-making body of the ECB, the 
General Council, is composed of the President, Vice-President, and all the governors of the 
NCBs of the EU member states. This body will remain in existence as long as there are EU 
member states that have not joined the EMU. The General Council works to strengthen the 
coordination of monetary policies among the non-EMU member states, to collect statistical 
information, and to make the transition towards full EMU membership smoother.
8
  
It has to be emphasised that the ECB is only a part of the entire Euro system, and it has no 
mandate to take decisions on its own, as the NCBs are also involved in decision-making.
9
 
Throughout this essay I will thus use „ECB‟ as a synonym for the Euro system and the reader 
should note that the ECB then refers to a broader concept. The organizational framework of 
the Euro system and its decision-making structure can be seen in figure 2 on the following 
page. From this figure it is clear that the decision-making procedure has an integrity that 
involves the NCBs, the Governing Council of the ECB, and the ECB as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 11. 
9 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 182. 
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Figure 2. Organizational framework of the Euro system
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates that the decision-making is channelled through the ECB and the 16 
NCBs who may want different interest rate levels. These requests are passed on to the 
Governing Council of the ECB who fixes what the interest should be. In turn, ECB‟s three 
decision-making bodies, together with the NCBs, implement the decision.
11
   
Article 108 of the Treaty established a central bank independent from political influence and 
so an institutional framework for the single monetary policy. Theoretical analysis and 
substantial empirical evidence indicates that the independence of the central bank is pivotal in 
maintaining price stability. According to the Treaty, the ECB, and the NCBs are forbidden to 
seek or take instructions from any Community institution or government. The Community 
institutions and the governments of the member states are also restricted in their influence 
                                               
10 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, figure 7.10, p. 182. 
11 IBID, p. 182. 
The Euro system consists of the ECB and the 16 NCBs. The decision-making begins with all of the 
NCBs governors requesting a specific interest rate level, and the ECB requests an interest level for 
the Eurozone as a whole. The Governing Council of the ECB is responsible for setting the official 
interest rate. The ECB as a whole, with its three decisions-making bodies, and the NCBs, implement 
that monetary policy.  
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upon the decision-making of the ECB.
12
 Below follows a brief description of the main tasks 
of the ECB: price stability and interest rate policy, open market operations, and the ECB‟s 
obligations toward member states. Finally, the problems within these areas will be outlined. 
 
2.1 The ECB’s price stability and interest rate policy 
The Treaty defines the primary objective of the ECB and its single monetary policy as to 
maintain price stability. This goal, in combination with an ECB institution characterized by 
political independence, is called the German model.
13
 Also, the ECB and the Euro system 
shall “support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the Community”14. This means that a high level of 
employment and sustainable non-inflationary growth is to be guaranteed. However, these 
aspects are only assured if price stability is maintained. The Treaty‟s focus on price stability is 
legitimatized by the fact that macroeconomic theory and empirical evidence show that 
monetary policy cannot influence any real variables such as unemployment or GDP level in 
the long run. In the long run, monetary policy can ultimately only influence the price level, 
the so-called monetary neutrality. If this is right, then the only natural objective for the ECB is 
to assure price stability.
15
 Because the ECB is an institution that priorities price stability over 
output and employment stabilization, the ECB may be called a „conservative‟ central bank.16 
Whether the money neutrality theory is relevant for economic policies has been debated over 
the years. Researchers like Lucas and Lothian, agree that money neutrality is accurate in the 
long run but others like Hsing and Gupta find evidence that money does affect output in the 
long run and that the effect varies between countries.
17
 This debate between different 
researchers‟ results raises serious doubt on the universality of the neutrality of money, and 
thus the ECB‟s claim to base their monetary policies on this theory might have implications.  
The transmission mechanism through which the interest rates affect primarily prices (and also 
the economy as a whole) is important here. The channels of monetary policy transmission 
                                               
12 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p.13. 
13 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 164. 
14 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p 10. 
15 IBID, p 43 
16 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 168. 
17 Upadhyaya; Dhakal, Atlantic Economic Journal, Neutrality of money and the Fisher hypothesis: Further 
empirical test. 
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consist of multiple layers and begin with a change in the official interest rate level. Figure 3 
on the following page illustrates the transmission mechanism from first impulse through to 
effects on the economy and the price level.
18
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the transmission mechanism from interest rates to prices
19
  
 
 
 
The ECB holds the monopoly on issuing money, as agreed by the monetary union, and this 
ultimately affects the official interest rate. A change in money market interest rates affects 
other interest rates, primarily, those set by banks on short-term loans and deposits. In addition, 
expectations of future official interest rates influence long-term market interest rates and, in a 
further perspective, more indirectly government bond yields and long-term bank lending rates. 
                                               
18 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 44. 
19 IBID, Chart 3.1, p 45. 
The official interest rates are set by the ECB. These influence people‟s expectations and behavior 
on the money-, finance-, and labor market. Bank and market interest rates are directly affected by 
the ECB‟s interest rates. These in turn affect the exchange rate, domestic prices, and consumer 
behavior. The transmission mechanism is very complex and this scheme illustrates why the ECB‟s 
only target is price stability. 
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However, the long-term rates highly depend on expectations for long-term growth and 
inflationary trends in the economy. The monetary policy can also affect other financial 
variables, such as exchange rates and asset prices (e.g. stocks), which in turn affect the saving, 
spending, consumption, and investment decisions of firms and households. As a consequence 
of a change in consumption and investment the level of domestic demand for goods and 
services will change relative to domestic supply, which may lead to influencing both wage 
and price-setting in that particular market. The exchange rate will change due to changes in 
the interest rate level and influence the price level (and thus inflation) either through a 
movement of domestic prices or the lower the cost of inputs into the production process. The 
result is either a lower price for final goods or an effect on the competitiveness of 
domestically produced goods in the international market. Ultimately, control of the price level 
and the stabilization of the economy is complex and the ECB‟s focus in only trying to 
influence the price level seems reasonable when looking at the many entwined channels 
through which their open market operations go through.
20
     
The Treaty‟s goal for the ECB to maintain and guarantee price stability, signalling a solid and 
sustainable economic growth and inflation trend over time, plays an important role. The 
ECB‟s aim is to maintain price stability ultimately means that they want to anchor inflation 
expectations. In 1998, the ECB stipulated that price stability “shall be defined as a year-on-
year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP
21
) for the euro area of 
below 2 percent. Price stability is to be maintained over the medium term”.22 The reasons for 
the Governing Council of the ECB to publicly announce and quantify the exact target of price 
stability are clearly stated as being fourfold: firstly, to clarify how the Governing Council of 
the ECB interprets the goal and makes the monetary policy easier to understand, secondly, the 
definition provides a clear and measurable standard to which the public can hold the ECB 
responsible, thirdly, deviations from the 2 percent goal can more easily be identified and 
attended and finally, the 2 percent goal functions as a guidance to the public around which it 
can form its inflation expectations.
23
  
The ECB‟s interest rate policy decisions in practice are simplified in the following fashion: 
when the ECB recognizes that the economy has a strong GDP growth, and that prices are 
                                               
20 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 45-48. 
21 Please advice Appendix A for more information on HICP. 
22 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 50. 
23 IBID, p. 52. 
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rising too fast, they want to increase the interest rate. They do this in order to make people 
consume less and to increase incentive to save money in banks, and as a result, reduce the 
money supply on the market so that prices are stabilized. Conversely, if the economy has to 
be stimulated the ECB lower the interest rate in order for GDP to grow more rapidly and 
prices to stabilize or increase.
24
  
It has to be emphasised that the effects of an interest rate policy decision are only felt for a 
couple of years after the policy was implemented: empirical data and evidence show that an 
increase in the short-term interest rate results in a temporary decrease in GDP, which peaks 
about two years after the initial monetary policy impulse and then evens out to the original 
level, and prices gradually adjusts to a permanently lower level. However, it is uncertain as to 
how fast and how much prices respond to an increase in the interest rate. Evidence show that 
the lag period stretches from two to four years and those prices are not affected with the 
whole increase but more in the region of 30 to 40 percent.
25
 This means that when the ECB 
has to make interest rate decisions they base their decisions on forecasts and prognoses on 
GDP and inflation in the future: an interest rate decision made by the ECB today has to be 
based on forecasts on GDP and inflation one to four years in the future, it has to be forward-
looking. 
 
2.1.1 Open market operations 
The ECB controls the liquidity situation on the market and the interest rate indirectly through 
open market operations
26
 that signal the stance of the monetary policy to the public. There are 
different kinds of open market operations, and which one is used depends on the aims and 
structure of the monetary policy in position. The ECB can use reverse transactions, outright 
transactions, issuance of debt certificates, foreign exchange swaps, and the collection of fixed-
term deposits.
27
 The most important instrument is the reverse transactions which have a 
weekly frequency and a maturity of normally one week. The reverse transactions are executed 
by the NCBs in the member states and are carried out through standard tenders.
28
 Standard 
                                               
24 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p 45. 
25 IBID, p. 48-51. 
26 Appendix B contains a more detailed description of the ECB‟s open market operations. 
27 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 8. 
28 IBID, p. 16. 
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tenders imply that the time and fashion from the announcement of the tender to the settlement 
of the transaction is set to a maximum of 24 hours.
29
 
 
2.2 The ECB’s obligations towards member states 
The ECB should not have any prior expectations on particular member states‟ economic 
performances. The ECB also recognizes that financial institutions and the harmonization of 
rules and procedures are to be treated equally throughout the Euro area, irrespective of where 
they are located. This criterion has to be guaranteed in order to provide identical conditions 
for all institutions in the monetary union.
30
 Because the EMU is a monetary union the area 
will experience divergence problems. Divergence could exist in any market, such as labor and 
financial, and in order to deal with these problems the ECB claims that their monetary policy 
should “aim to achieve over the medium-term an inflation rate for the area as a whole that is 
high enough to prevent regions with structurally lower inflation rates from having to meet the 
costs of possible downward nominal rigidities or entering periods of protracted deflation”31. 
Again, this ultimately means that the ECB should aim at 2 percent inflation rate and price 
stability over the medium term for the union as a whole.
32
 The ECB has not outlined any 
further specific obligations towards the monetary union‟s members.  
 
2.2.1 Interest rate desires and decisions 
When deciding the interest rate for the Eurozone the procedure is initiated by the national 
governors, who desire certain interest rates given the economic conditions prevailing in their 
own countries. Firstly, the governors of the Governing Council of the ECB should not take 
note of their own national economic conditions and should only be concerned about the 
Eurozone as a whole. Secondly, the ECB Executive Board desires an interest rate based on 
Eurozone aggregates and the wishes of the country, which means that the ECB‟s desired 
interest rate will be an average of the economic performance for the Eurozone as a whole and 
an average of the wishes of each member country. When calculating this interest rate the ECB 
                                               
29 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 24. 
30
 The European Central Bank (2008), The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area: General 
Documentation on Euro system monetary policy instruments and procedures, p. 73 
31 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 55 
32 IBID, p. 54-55 
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Executive Board is very much influenced by the large countries: for example, when 
calculating the aggregate interest rate, the ECB has to take relative size into account which 
favors large countries such as Germany, Spain and France.
33
  
Problems within the main tasks of the ECB, outlined on the previous pages, will be identified 
and evaluated in the following section. 
 
2.3 The ECB and potential problems 
The EMU is a currency area and according to the theory on “optimal currency areas”, there 
will always be divergences and asymmetries in business cycles between countries. These 
differences don‟t have to imply problems if they are transitory; however, countries will suffer 
from these differences if they are structural, and if those monetary policies that are meant to 
stabilize does not work.
34
 Structural differences do exist between EMU member countries and 
consequently many problems within the main pillars of the ECB will arise.  
The transmission mechanism is complex (as seen in figure 3) and the ECB has no ability to 
affect and correct all markets within an economy in the long run as an interest rate decision 
can ultimately only influence the price stability. Even so, the economy and its agent will 
change and adjust to an interest rate decision in the short and medium run. Since structural 
divergences exist between EMU member countries, their markets will be differently affected 
by changes in the interest rates. For example, if Italy has high unemployment and structural 
problems with wages and employment, and Greece does not, the two countries will be 
affected differently. This also applies to the financial market where stocks, other interest rates, 
and domestic production have different prerequisites. The structural differences between 
countries compel the ECB to carry out its monetary policies with precaution since it is clearly 
problematical to fully grasp what effects might arise within different countries.     
Forecasts are problematic since it is difficult to estimate changes in productivity, consumer 
behavior, market forces, output gaps, inflation, and other factors that influence GDP growth. 
If the prognoses are in fact wrong and if the interest rate decisions are based on these 
forecasts, the outcome will be incorrect. If the interest rates are misguided, this could affect 
the EMU members negatively, and have effects on the economies that are hard to correct. The 
                                               
33 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 184-186. 
34 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p. 9, 12. 
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ECB is considered a conservative central bank that is careful when trying to adjust the 
economy. Even if this is true, the ECB has, especially during certain years, changed and 
corrected the interest rate level several times within short intervals. Is this a sign of that the 
ECB corrects the interest rate levels due to new information on forecasts (implying that the 
former decisions were misguided), or is the ECB just careful when changing the interest rates 
and acts out its monetary policy gradually? The answer here is not obvious, but we can see 
that relying on economic forecasts is highly volatile. 
Inflation differentials across regions in the union are normal features of a monetary union and 
they are an integral part of the adjustment mechanism that results from divergence in 
economic development across the union‟s countries. Inflation differentials may be due to 
transitory or structural factors. If the differences are transitory they are of little economic 
concern and only temporary. If they arise because of structural differences across countries, 
such as differences in income levels and standards and unemployment preferences, this might 
create economic problems. These inflation differentials could cause the paralysis of the ECB 
or at least make the bank‟s work substantially harder. Inflation differentials between the 
union‟s members also affect the real interest rate. When discussing interest rates throughout 
this essay, the nominal interest rates (r) have been the main focus. However, the real interest 
rate, R, (nominal interest rate – inflation: r-i) is more informative when comparing different 
countries.
35
 As can be seen in the data in appendix C, the Eurozone countries have 
experienced different levels of inflation over time. However, they are all obliged to operate 
under the same nominal interest rate level, which ultimately means that the real interest rates 
will be different across countries. Figure 4 on the following page illustrates different real 
interest rates averages for the older member countries (before 2005) from 1997 to 2004. 
 
 
                                               
35  Fregert, Klas; Jonung, Lars, Makroekonomi Teori, politik & institutioner, p. 97. 
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Figure 4. Average real interest rates in Eurozone countries (1997-2004)
36
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 on the previous page, illustrates the fact that the real interest rates differ between the 
EMU countries. The countries that have experienced high inflation, like Ireland, will have a 
systematically lower real interest rate; and the countries with stable and low inflation, like 
Austria and Germany, will experience higher real interest rates. These differences will affect 
both the credit market and primary loans for the housing market differently in each country. 
As Paul De Grauwe also points out, this will lead to problematic spillover effects primarily in 
the housing market.
37
 These divergent real interest rates are another aspect as to how 
structural differences create problems for the ECB and the EMU member countries.  
According to the Treaty on the European Union, as outlined before, the ECB and the NCBs 
are forbidden to seek or take instructions from any Community institution or any government. 
The Community institutions and the governments of the member states are also restricted in 
how much influence they may exert upon the decision-making of the ECB: however, there is 
evidence, presented by Heinemann and Hüfner (2002), indicating that this is unlikely and that 
national interest in fact plays an important role in the decision-making; the differences in 
desired interest rates between countries and the bias that the ECB calculates the shared 
interest rate with regard to country size, illustrate that many member states are likely to be 
unsatisfied with the interest rate decisions of the ECB.
38
  
                                               
36 Fregert, Klas; Jonung, Lars, Makroekonomi Teori, politik & institutioner, p 13. 
37 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p 12. 
38 IBID, p. 200. 
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All the problems described above combine to make the problem formulation outlined in this 
essay an important one to answer and investigate. If some member states are more favoured 
than others, then this means that the countries that do not fit the EMU framework will face 
problems. In addition to the problems described above, the stabilization of the economy and 
reactions to boosts and recessions become problematic. Inflationary differences as well as 
asymmetric shocks hit countries differently and these illustrate the ECB‟s inflexibility to 
adjust these properly. Further, countries‟ relative competiveness could decline due to 
increasing costs and different real interest rates. All these problems could cause a paralysis of 
the ECB as no monetary policy is effective for all countries.
39
 Whether some members are in 
fact more favoured by the ECB‟s interest rate decisions will be investigated and presented in 
the following data analysis and comparison section.   
 
3. Data analysis and comparison 
The following section describes how the analysis was executed, as well as presenting the 
motivation to the method of analysis and depicting a selection of data which will contribute to 
answer the question as to whether some EMU members are more favoured by the ECB‟s 
interest rate decisions than others. 
As we compare and draw conclusions based on the forecasts made by the European 
Commission the interest rate decisions made by the ECB has to be analysed on the basis of 
the forecast that were available and applicable at that specific time. For example, the interest 
rate decision made on 28 April 2000 is analysed with data and forecast on output gap and 
inflation from the European Commission that was presented in Spring 2000; and the interest 
rate decision made on 13 May 2009 which uses the forecast made in Spring 2009 to predict 
future economic development. It should be noted that some forecasts have been used more 
than once in order to analyze the ECB‟s interest rate decisions. At times this was required 
because the ECB‟s interest rate decisions were more frequent than updates of the European 
Commission‟s forecasts. Why the ECB corrected their initial interest rate decisions more 
often than simply doing so when a new forecast was presented is unclear. Either they altered 
their view on the forecasts and thus revised the interest rate level or these updates illustrate 
the conservative manner of the ECB‟s monetary policy. However, any discrepancy between 
                                               
39 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p. 14, 17. 
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interest rate decisions and updated forecasts should not affect the results presented in this 
essay. The results are not affected in a biased way because all countries are systematically 
treated the same way and will be affected accordingly.  
 
3.1 Interest rate decisions 
When comparing interest rate decisions and the forecasts on output and inflation, it is 
important not to over-analyse the projected deviations from potential GDP or projected 
inflation. Data shows that some Eurozone-countries have experienced constantly higher 
inflation over time than other Eurozone-countries. This does not have to be a negative thing as 
long as the high inflation countries also have a higher productivity growth.
40
 In fact the higher 
inflation in the high productivity growth countries is an equilibrating mechanism. This means 
that if productivity grows faster in one country than in another, this causes wages and the 
price of non-tradable goods to increase faster in order to keep the competitive position of both 
countries‟ tradable goods sector unchanged, the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect.41 
However, this does not have to be applicable for all the Eurozone-countries in the analysis 
and comment on this phenomenon will be presented when relevant.  
A table is presented on the following page with the key interest rates from 2000 to 2009. 
“Level” indicates the nominal interest rate level for the Eurozone and “change” indicates the 
percentage change from former interest rate level that each policy decision implied. The 
Governing Council of the ECB meets twice a month and assesses the economic situation and 
the stance of the monetary policy at its first meeting. If there is a monetary policy change, i.e. 
a change in the key interest rates, the Governing Council holds a press conference to publicly 
announce this.
42
 It should be noted that the ECB Executive Board meetings, which resulted in 
no change or new stance of the interest rate, is not presented in the table. However their 
significance will be discussed in the conclusion. 
 
 
 
                                               
40 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 200. 
41 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 46. 
42 http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html, 2009-10-11 
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Table 1 
43
 
Key interest rate data      
      
Year Date Level Change +/- 
2000 28-Apr 3.75 0.25 
  09-Jun 4.25 0.5 
  28-Jun 4.25 0 
  01-Sep 4.50 0.25 
  06-Oct 4.75 0.25 
2001 11-May 4.50 -0.25 
  31-Aug 4.25 -0.25 
  18-Sep 3.75 -0.5 
  09-Nov 3.25 -0.5 
2002 06-Dec 2.75 -0.5 
2003 07-Mar 2.50 -0.25 
  06-Jun 2.00 -0.5 
2005 06-Dec 2.25 0.25 
2006 08-Mar 2.50 0.25 
  15-Jun 2.75 0.25 
  09-Aug 3.00 0.25 
  11-Oct 3.25 0.25 
  13-Dec 3.50 0.25 
2007 14-Mar 3.75 0.25 
  13-Jun 4.00 0.25 
2008 09-Jul 4.25 0.25 
  8-Oct(1) - - 
  9-Oct - - 
  15-Oct 3.75 0.5 
  12-Nov 3.25 -0.5 
  10-Dec 2.50 -0.75 
2009 21-Jan 2.00 -0.5 
  11-Mar 1.50 -0.5 
  08-Apr 1.25 -0.25 
  13-May 1 -0.25 
      
(1) On 8 October 2008 the ECB announced that, starting from the operation on 
15 October, the weekly main refinancing operations would be carried out 
through a fixed rate tender instead of variable rate tenders 
 
Ultimately each percentage change of the interest rate in the table above is compared with the 
forecasts from the European Commission on output gap and inflation, and all this raw data is 
                                               
43  http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html, 2009-10-15 
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presented in appendix C. One can see from table 1 that in 2004 there were no interest rate 
decisions, and comment on this and the potential implications will also be outlined in the 
conclusion.  
 
3.2 Forecasts on output gap and inflation 
As the ECB‟s interest rate decisions are forward looking they have to be based on economic 
forecasts of one to four years into the future. In order to make an investigation as to whether 
interest rate policy decisions favour some countries more than others (based primarily on 
specific member countries‟ economic data) economic forecasts made by the European 
Commission stretching back to spring 2000 were analyzed. In particular forecasts for output 
gap relative to potential GDP growth and forecasts on inflation which are measured in HICP 
(see appendix A for description) were analyzed. We will only look at these two indicators as 
interest rate decisions are highly based on the expected development of GDP growth and 
inflation. The ECB also includes other factors in their profound analysis of the economy when 
deciding the interest rate level; but, significantly, the output gap relative to potential GDP and 
inflation is the key indicator; evidence shows that even though the ECB‟s only official goal is 
to ensure price stability, which is to keep inflation at about 2 percent, interest rates are also 
highly correlated and affected by output gaps: output gap movements have good predictive 
power of future inflation and thus the ECB will systematically react to output gap movements 
as well as inflation.
44
  
Output gap and potential GDP growth are fundamental in assessing the cyclical position of an 
economy and they are essential components of the Stability and Growth Pact‟s surveillance 
process. Potential growth is a summary indicator of the economy‟s ability to generate 
sustainable, non-inflationary, growth and the output gap is an indication of the degree of 
deviation from this potential stabilized growth path. These economic indicators are difficult to 
calculate and forecasts on output gaps have to be interpreted with care.  However, the output 
gap relative to potential GDP growth provides good indication as to what the appropriate mix 
of macroeconomic and structural policies should be taken in order to eliminate cyclical slack 
or raise the output potential of the economy.
45
 There is empirical evidence that the output gap 
                                               
44 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 173. 
45 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/specpub_list12526.htm, Economic Forecast Spring 2009, p. 
37. 
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and the interest rate vary together, i.e. if the output gap is positive the interest rate will be 
higher and vice versa
46,47
. Below, figure 5 illustrates how the interest rate has co-varied with 
the output gap development over time for the aggregate Eurozone. 
Figure 5. Short-term interest rate and output gap in the Eurozone (1999-2004)
48
 
This figure clearly shows that when the output gap is positive the interest rate will be higher, 
and when the output gap is negative the interest rate will be lower. The evidence that the 
interest rate has followed the output gap over time, and therefore a pivotal indicator of how 
the ECB should set its interest rate level, will make us base our analysis from this point of 
view. The following section will outline the calculations and method used in assessing the 
data on interest rates and forecasts. 
 
3.3 Calculations and method 
In order to break down and compare the data on output gap, inflation, and interest rates a 
calculation of how the interest rate decisions (in table 1) fitted with each country‟s economic 
                                               
46 De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union, p. 174 
47 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p. 10. 
48 IBID, Figure 10, p. 10. 
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performance with regard to the output gaps and inflation was taken. The idea behind the 
calculations is to see whether the interest rates were better suited to some countries‟ economic 
performance than others. The results are presented both in relative numbers and percent, as 
countries have different denominators. A presentation in percent makes it possible to rank the 
countries and thus get an overview on which countries performed best and worst. 
 
3.3.1 Calculations on interest rates: output gaps, and inflation 
In order to present any data and figures that illustrate the connections between interest rates 
and output gaps and inflation three different calculations were conducted that will be 
presented below. Three other calculations that are based on the former will also be presented 
later on. 
      1) The first calculation explains the relationship between interest rates and output gaps. 
The method was to follow the idea that when the output gap is positive the interest rates 
should be adjusted upwards, and when the output gap is negative the interest rates should be 
lowered. We assume that when the output gap is zero the interest rate level should not change 
because the economy is performing exactly according to the stabilized growth path. For all the 
“older” EMU member states this means looking at 28 interest rate decisions made by the ECB 
and individually compare these with the forecasted output gaps for each country. For the new 
member states Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, this means looking at 16 interest rate 
decisions made by the ECB and in the same manner, and individually comparing these with 
the forecasted output gaps for these countries.
49
 Each country is evaluated on a scale from 
zero to 100 percent, where 100 percent means that all the interest rate decisions were the right 
decisions with regard to the output gap situation and zero percent means that none of the 
interest rate decisions where right with regard to the forecasted output gaps. The results from 
the calculation on „interest rate versus output gaps‟ are presented in figure 6 and table 2 at 
page 28. 
2) When calculating and processing the data on interest rates versus inflation one has to bear 
in mind the price stability goal that the ECB primarily looked at when deciding and setting the 
interest rate. Price stability means that the inflation should be around 2 percent for the 
medium run. For this calculation we have assumed that this means that the inflation can vary 
                                               
49 Note that each interest rate change for the old countries is 3.6 percent since we have 28 observations (100/28) 
and 6.5 percent (100/16) for the new countries where we have 16 observations. It is important not just to look at 
the percent, but also the relative numbers in order to get a just image of the results. 
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around 2 percent with +- 0.2 percent and still be regarded as stable.
50
 This implies an interval 
where levels of inflation at 2.3 percent or higher should be adjusted with a higher interest rate 
in order to decrease the inflation. Levels of inflation at 1.7 percent or lower should be 
corrected with a lower interest rate level in order to stimulate the economy and thus increase 
the inflation. An inflation rate that lies within the interval of 1.8-2.2 percent means that no 
change of the interest rate should be carried out. As outlined before, there are cases in some 
countries when the inflation is consistently higher than 2.2 percent. This does not have to be 
seen as an anomaly and can be explained by the equilibrating Balassa-Samuelson effect when 
productivity growth is simultaneously higher. However, to avoid any further subjective 
analysis and calculation than the estimated intervals already imply, let us assume that any 
inflation level at 2.3 percent or higher should imply a higher interest rate, without regard to a 
possible Balassa-Samuelson effect. In order to see if the changes in interest rate levels were 
the right decisions for each country‟s forecasted inflation situation, let us proceed in the same 
manner as for the “interest rates versus output gap” calculation. For the older member states 
28 interest rate decisions are considered and for the new member states only 16, and these are 
compared with each country‟s forecasted inflation situation. Again 100 percent conformity 
means that all the interest rate decisions were the appropriate decisions with regard to the 
inflation situation and zero percent means that none of the interest rate decisions were right. 
Figure 7 and table 2 on the following pages illustrates the outcome of the calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
50 This interval is subjectively created in order to avoid a too narrow calculation. To only consider exactly 2 
percent as a stable inflation growth is too specific and the interval of 1.8-2.2 percent means that any country‟s 
inflation can vary within this interval without being regarded as unstable. One could imagine other intervals, and 
it has to be emphasized that other intervals would change the result presented in table 2 and figure 7. If we would 
include all the times the ECB had a monetary meeting but decided not change the interest rate level, we also 
would have ended up with a different result. 
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Figure 6. Conformity between interest rate decisions and output gaps 
 
Figure 7. Conformity between interest rate decisions and inflation 
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Table 2. Conformity between interest rate decisions and output gaps and inflation 
Interest rates vs. output gaps 
  
Interest rates vs. inflation 
 
Country 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
  
Country 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
 
Slovakia 16/16 100%  Slovenia 10/16 63% 
Slovenia 16/16 100%  Slovakia 8/16 50% 
Germany 18/28 64%  Greece 14/28 50% 
Austria 17/28 61%  Ireland 13/28 46% 
Greece 17/28 61%  France 13/28 46% 
Netherlands 15/28 54%  Spain 13/28 46% 
Finland 14/28 50%  Germany 12/28 43% 
Luxemburg 14/28 50%  Netherlands 11/28 39% 
Portugal 14/28 50%  Belgium 11/28 39% 
Belgium 13/28 46%  Portugal 10/28 36% 
Cyprus 7/16 44%  Luxemburg 9/28 32% 
France 12/28 43%  Malta 5/16 31% 
Spain 11/28 39%  Cyprus 4/16 25% 
Ireland 11/28 39%  Austria 7/28 25% 
Malta 6/16 38%  Finland 5/28 18% 
Italy 10/28 36%  Italy 1/28 4% 
 
The tables presented above show the ranking of the countries in each calculation. They show 
the relative numbers and the percent for each country, and in order to see how well any 
country performed in these calculations, one has to look at both the numbers and the percent 
to get an idea of the results. Comment on the results will be presented in section 3.4. 
3) The third calculation combines the results from calculation one on “interest rates versus 
output gaps” and calculation two on “interest rates versus inflation”. To combine the two is 
interesting as this tells us something about the entire economic picture and not just the 
variables output gap and inflation separately. However, if the two are to be summarized, one 
has to consider if they are of equal importance when the interest rate is being set by the ECB. 
As outlined before, the ECB only has price stability as its goal. However, output gap and GDP 
growth have also proven important for the interest rate levels over time. Since we do not have 
evidence as to whether the one is more important than the other to the ECB and its interest 
rate decisions, I decide for them to be equally important in this calculation. This implies that 
this calculation on average conformity has to be interpreted according to an equal weighting 
of 0.5, and that altering these weights would change the result.  
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The result in this calculation is an average between the numbers and percentage on 
conformity between interest rates and output gaps and inflation. Accordingly, we have 
summed up each country‟s numbers and also calculated the percentage conformity, which will 
be an average. The result is an average conformity presented in figure 8 and table 3 below.  
 
Figure 8. Average conformity between interest rate decisions and output gaps and 
inflation 
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Table 3. Average conformity between interest rate decisions and output gaps and 
inflation combined 
Country 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
 
Slovenia 26/32 81% 
Slovakia 24/32 75% 
Greece 31/56 55% 
Germany 30/56 54% 
Netherlands 26/56 47% 
France 25/56 45% 
Austria 24/56 43% 
Portugal 24/56 43% 
Belgium 24/56 43% 
Ireland 24/56 43% 
Spain 24/56 43% 
Luxemburg 23/56 41% 
Malta 11/32 35% 
Cyprus 11/32 35% 
Finland 21/56 34% 
Italy 11/56 20% 
 
The table above illustrates the added numbers and the calculated average percent. In order to 
get a complete picture on which countries that overall performed best, one has to look both at 
the relative numbers and the percent. It has to be emphasized that the countries still have 
different denominators depending on whether they are new or old EMU member states. The 
old member states will have 56 (28+28) as denominator and the new member states will have 
32 (16+16) as denominator. In order to rank the countries the percent is illustrative. 
 
3.4 Comparison 
If we go back and look at figures 6 and 7 and their corresponding tables on page 28 and 29, 
one can easily witness the obvious differences in how often the interest rate decisions are 
favorable for each country. The tables show that the conformity between interest rates and 
output gaps varies from 36 to 100 percent and 4 to 63 percent for inflation. Let us now outline 
and comment on each calculation individually and also compare the two with each other.  
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3.4.1 Output gap 
The results presented in figure 6 and table 2 show that there are in fact great differences in 
how often the interest rate decisions were favorable with regard to the forecasted output gap 
situations between the countries. The new member states Slovakia and Slovenia have 100 
percent conformity between the interest rate decisions and output gaps. Other countries with 
high percentage are Austria, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands. The bottom four, Spain, 
Ireland, Malta and Italy, are countries that according to the data in appendix C, have shown 
unstable and negative output gaps over time. This calculation also implies that the interest rate 
decisions have, in fact, not been favorable for these countries.  
To see how the conformity between interest rates and output gaps have been for the Eurozone 
as a whole over time, I have conducted a calculation on all the interest rate decisions 
presented in table 1 and all the forecasts on output gap presented in the tables in appendix C. 
This calculation was carried out through counting how many countries were favored each year 
by the various interest rate decisions. To establish if an interest rate decision was right for a 
country the same theory as in calculation 1 on page 26 was used. This calculation sheds light 
on, and tells us something about, if and when a majority of the countries have benefitted from 
the interest rate decisions, and when the ECB made interest rate decisions that did not favor 
the Eurozone countries. The result is presented in figure 9 below and illustrates that the 
conformity has varied significantly over time for the aggregate Eurozone. 
Figure 9. Variation on conformity between interest rates and output gap for the 
aggregate Eurozone (2000-2009) 
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From figure 9 it is apparent that the interest rate decisions in 2000 were strongly in 
accordance with the forecasted development for output gaps for the Eurozone-countries. As 
much as 76 percent of the interest rate decisions concurred with the output gap situations for 
the aggregate Eurozone. This tells us that the ECB‟s monetary policy at this point in time was 
right on target. However, this changed in 2001 where almost all the countries experienced 
positive output gaps, but the ECB decided to decrease the interest rate for the entire period, 
the result from the calculation tells us that the conformity at this point was only around 10 
percent. This trend changed in 2002 and 2003 when the interest rates were decreased but were 
more suitable with regard to the economic development of the Eurozone-countries. The years 
of 2005 to 2007 are interesting because this was a long period when the interest rate decisions 
had low conformity with the forecasted output gap development. The average percentage 
conformity for these years was about 26 percent which is very low for a three year period. 
The data in appendix C and the key interest rates in table 1 inform us that the ECB increased 
the interest rate for this entire period, whilst many of the Eurozone-countries were projected 
to have significant negative output gaps. According to the theory that interest rates follow 
output gaps, the right policy would have been to decrease the interest rates in order to 
stimulate the economy and correct the negative output gaps. Ireland, Malta and Portugal 
(which from figure 6 and table 2 are the amongst the bottom six countries) were expressly 
projected to have large negative output gaps during this period. However the ECB did not 
react to the economic slowdown until 2008 when the interest rates were lowered. Since then 
the conformity between the interest rates and the projected output gaps have increased to a 
high level of about 96 percent in 2009.  
 
3.4.2 Inflation 
As for the calculations on interest rates versus inflation, table 2 and figure 7 indicate that there 
were also significant differences between the conformity between countries. The interest rate 
decisions were most on target, with regard to the forecasted inflation, in Slovenia, Slovakia 
and Greece. The bottom two were Italy and Finland. If we conduct the same type of 
calculation on variations of conformity as we did for the output gap in the previous section, 
we can illustrate the conformity between interest rates and inflation over time for the 
aggregate Eurozone. The result is presented in figure 10 on the following page. 
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Figure 10. Variation on conformity between interest rates and inflation for the aggregate 
Eurozone (2000-2009) 
 
Figure 10 illustrates that there has only been a slight increase in conformity between interest 
rates and inflation from 2000 to 2009. There have not been any dramatic ups or downs over 
time and the result seems stable for the Eurozone as a whole. However, it is interesting to note 
that the conformity between any interest rate decision and the forecasted inflation has never 
been higher than 40 percent and that the average is just over 34 percent. This means that for 
all the interest rate decisions from April 28 in 2000 to May 13 in 2009 almost 66 percent of 
the countries did, at average, not benefit from the interest rate decisions. The evaluation from 
the data in appendix C and the calculations on interest rates versus inflation presented in table 
2 imply that the countries that benefited the least over time were Italy and Finland. Both had 
very low forecasted inflation growth, just below 2 percent for the entire time period. Greece, 
Slovakia and Slovenia did benefit from the interest rate decisions and they proved to have 
rather high inflation growth, just over 3 percent at average. The implications will be evaluated 
and discussed in the conclusion.  
 
3.4.3 Output gap and inflation 
Calculations and illustrations of the conformity between interest rates and output and inflation 
are individually interesting but the two combined gives us a more complete picture on the 
issue. When we combine the individually calculated results we end up with an average 
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conformity between interest rates and output gaps and inflation. Figure 8 and table 3 tell us 
that Slovenia and Slovakia are at the top. This is not surprising since the countries were 
uncontested in the “interest rates versus output gap” analysis with 100 percent conformity and 
also performed best when the focus was inflation. Older member countries like Greece, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, also benefit to a high degree from the single interest rate 
polices. However, most of the countries are on average neither favoured nor overlooked by 
the ECB‟s interest rate decisions as they have an average conformity between 40 to 50 
percent. Finland and Cyprus are amongst the bottom three countries and cannot be said to 
benefit from the interest rate decisions. Italy performed worst in all calculations, so it is not 
surprising that it did so in this analysis as well. More discussion around the results will be 
presented in the conclusion.  
If we conduct the same calculation on variation on conformity over time for the aggregate 
Eurozone we get the result in figure 11 below. We can see how the combined average has 
evened out the large ups and downs from table 9 but the line is not as straight as for the 
inflation analysis in figure 10. This implies that the interest rate decisions‟ appropriateness 
has varied over time for the Eurozone countries. It also suggests that the ECB is slow at 
reacting to slowdowns or boosts in the economy. However, from 2005 and forward, when 
many new countries joined the EMU, the trend has been more stable and the conformity has 
increased to the highest level since the start in 2000. 
Figure 11. Variation on average conformity between interest rates and output gaps and 
inflation combined for the aggregate Eurozone (2000-2009) 
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4. Conclusion 
As seen in the preceding analysis there are indications that suggest that the single monetary 
policy with a common interest rate benefits some EMU members more than others, with 
regard to their projected economic development. The answer to the question, “Are some EMU 
members more favoured by the ECB‟s interest rate decisions than others?” is then, yes.  It can 
be seen from the data in appendix C that the countries that had the highest conformity 
between interest rate levels and output gaps were the countries that have shown a stabile and 
mostly positive GDP growth over time. These countries also had high projected inflation 
growths. These countries are Slovenia and Slovakia. It is surprising that these countries 
performed the best in both calculations, and because they did so in both, the result cannot be 
disregarded. Since this analysis is not country specific and more profound, the reasons to why 
Slovenia and Slovakia has benefited from the interest rate decisions from 2005 to 2009 is not 
obvious. One possible answer could be that both countries are flexible, new open economies 
whose economies rely much on the European market. This suggests that their economies fit 
the EMU-framework well. Their strong forecasted economic growth and the high inflation 
growth suggests that the countries might experience a catching-up effect: this means that the 
economies grow faster because they can benefit from using new EU market-available 
technologies and could replicate production methods that make the production more effective. 
From 2005, when Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EMU, the interest rates have been mostly 
increased. This obviously favours countries like Slovakia and Slovenia who experienced fast 
growing production and high inflation.    
The countries that performed the worst in the preceding analysis were countries that showed 
too low, or too high, or unstable projected inflation growth over time, and often large negative 
output gaps. These countries‟ forecasted economic performances seem to deviate too much 
from the projected aggregate Eurozone growth path and were thus not benefited by the 
interest rate decisions that were made. From the average conformity calculation, these 
countries were Malta, Cyprus, Finland and above all, Italy.  
It would be of benefit to specifically discuss Italy‟s situation. Italy was not benefited from the 
interest rates 2000 to 2009. Specifically, the country performed shockingly in the “interest 
rates versus inflation calculation”, when only one of 28 decisions or equivalent 4 percent of 
the interest rates were the right decisions for Italy. The average combined conformity was 
around 20 percent and explanations to why Italy is un-favoured by the single monetary 
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policies might be that the country did not live up to any projections on strong economic 
development and the projected inflation growth was just around 2 percent during the entire 
time period. The “interest rates versus inflation calculation” assumed that when the inflation 
lies within the interval 1.8 to 2.2 percent, the right interest rate decision should be not to 
change the interest rate at all. Within this interval the inflation is stable and it does not need to 
be adjusted. Because Italy had a stable forecasted inflation growth around 2 percent during the 
entire time period it is obvious that the interest rate decisions did not favor Italy. The right 
interest rate decision for Italy would have been not to adjust the interest rate, however this 
was only applied once in 28th June, 2000 when the ECB “changed” the interest rate with 0 
points. Even though the interest rate decisions did not fit the forecasted Italian inflation 
growth they do not seem to have made the inflation growth unstable over time. However, it is 
possible to think that the production growth has been affected negatively by the mismatched 
interest rates. The economy has not received the monetary stimulus required to correct the 
negative output gaps. The evidence that the monetary policy of the ECB does not favor 
countries equally could raise incentives or temptations to leave the union. This thought is also 
shared by Paul De Grauwe in his publication “The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects” where 
he states the fact that Italy have lost competiveness due to the inflation goal (all too low, he 
says) of 2 percent and because the interest rates have not fitted Italy‟s economy51.      
The average variation on conformity between interest rates and output gaps and inflation in 
figure 11 for the aggregate Eurozone from 2000 to 2009 has illustrated that during certain 
time periods the interest rate decisions have fitted the Eurozone better than at other points in 
time. Should this be thought of as a slack in the ECB‟s ability to perceive slowdowns in the 
economy or is it more of a structural problem? As the ECB is thought of as a conservative 
central bank, run on the German model, many of the asymmetric shocks that hit the Eurozone 
in 2003-2004 paralyzed the ECB and the only option for the central bank was to ensure price 
stability. As seen from table 1 and the key interest rates for the ECB, there were no interest 
rate decisions made in 2004. This either tells us that the ECB deliberately chose not to use its 
power on taking new interest rate decisions in order to signal a new monetary stance or the 
ECB was paralyzed by the shocks hitting the aggregate economy. However, the lack of 
conformity between the interest rates and the output gaps and inflation from 2005 to 2008 also 
illustrates the fact that the ECB does not react to shocks when deciding their interest rates; 
they mainly focus on price stability. Maybe this is a wise way for the ECB to operate its 
                                               
51 De Grauwe, The Eurozone: Problems and Prospects, p. 18. 
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monetary policy as it creates clear and stabile politics, but as seen from the analysis in section 
3, many countries are not favoured by the monetary stance. However, recent monetary actions 
illustrate a different direction for the ECB. Today, the interest rate level is 1 percent for the 
Eurozone; this is the lowest since the beginning of the EMU. Data from appendix C informs 
us that the forecasted output gaps for 2010 are projected to be significantly negative and will 
remain low for the entire area. Inflation growth is also forecast to be lower than the price 
stability goal of about 2 percent. The global economic slowdown has thus affected the ECB in 
their incentives to try to stimulate the economy, and to lower the interest rates. This 
contradicts the statement that the ECB is a conservative central bank that does not react to 
shocks hitting the economy. This might imply that the ECB has different interest rate decision 
criterions at different points in time, and that shocks hitting the aggregate economy thus have 
an impact. Or maybe the varying bad fit between interest rates and economic forecasts is an 
innate problem of the ECB which ultimately means that the bank is not capable of providing 
the best monetary policy for its members. However, the ECB is not the only institution or 
actor responsible for the EMU member countries‟ economic performances. Other institutions 
within the EU and the EMU members‟ own governments, are also responsible for operating in 
a way and implementing measures that promotes economic growth and stability. One could 
consider that the countries most benefitted by the ECB‟s interest rate decisions in this analysis 
are the ones who implement and work on all the structural convergence policies that the 
Stability and Growth Pact has prescribed. One way to explain Italy‟s bad conformity with the 
ECB‟s interest rate decisions could be that Italy has implemented these structural convergence 
policies in a poor way and thus doesn‟t operate as expected. Thus, the ECB isn‟t all to blame. 
The differences in inflation growth between countries could be explained by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect outlined earlier. It is possible that countries like Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ireland have experienced high inflation growth over time because they also have high 
productivity growth. If this is the case then the countries are not harmed by the fact that the 
ECB has been unable to adjust the high inflation level. The calculations in this essay might 
suggest that they are in fact not harmed because the countries performed well in the analysis 
and seems to be favoured by the interest rates.  
The Governing Council of the ECB meets one time a month and decides whether or not to 
change the interest rate level. When they do change the interest rate level, this is publicly 
announced and table 1 illustrates the key interest rate levels that have been publicized. When 
they do not change the interest rate level the Governing Council‟s meeting goes by unnoticed, 
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and further, the decision not to change the interest rates is not publicized. This affects the 
analysis and the calculations in this essay. If the ECB does not change the interest rate level 
they must consider the aggregate economy to be stable because no adjustment has to be made. 
Countries like Italy, who have shown stable forecasted inflation growth over time, would have 
benefited if these decisions not to change the interest rate would have been included in the 
analysis. Every time Italy had an inflation growth between 1.8 to 2.2 percent and the ECB did 
not change the interest rate level this was a correct monetary policy decision for Italy, 
although not publicly announced. This reasoning is also applicable for other countries that 
have shown stable inflation growth over time but were not favored in the calculation on 
interest rates and inflation. One could consider that if all the non-changes would have been 
included as a proper interest rate decision in the analysis, the results would be different. 
However, the calculations and results presented in this essay also shed light on whether the 
publicized interest rates favoured certain countries more than others, as the publicly 
announced interest rate changes are in fact the ones that the public, corporations and 
governments base their inflation expectations on. These publicized interest rate changes are 
the ones that have the most impact on the economy and the stabilization of prices. 
All the evidence and data has shown us that there are in fact countries that are more favoured 
by the interest rate decisions than others. Too much emphasizes should not be put on which 
country performed the best or worst in the calculations since these could be altered and are 
somewhat subjective due to intervals etc. The importance is to recognize the fact that the 
results illustrate that there is a vast difference between how often countries have benefitted 
from the interest rates set by the ECB from 2000 to 2009. This leads to the conclusion that 
there should exist different incentives and motivations between countries concerning how 
attractive the EMU and the single monetary policy are. If countries feel that they are not 
favoured by the single interest rate and the monetary policies this could lead to or increase 
incentives to leave the union. Other non-EMU members, like Sweden and the UK, could also 
vindicate their decision not to enter the monetary union because of the evidence that countries 
are differently favoured and at times the ECB and its interest rates does not react to 
slowdowns or negative economic development. A national central bank whose only concern is 
the national economy would seem more safe and beneficial.     
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4.1 Further research 
In order to investigate if the monetary union fits certain member states better than others, and 
not just to look at the interest rate decisions implemented by the ECB, one could consider 
many other aspects of the union, such as structural rigidities, divergence problems, underlying 
inflation and the labor market. Considering the size of the interest rate change could also be 
an interesting topic to examine: as the EMU members perform economically different they 
should also require a different size of an interest rate level change. My investigation, whether 
the interest rates favor some member state more than others, sheds light only on one little part 
of the complex system. The findings could imply that some policy changes are in order but, to 
fully grasp the complete picture, substantial further research should be carried out. Another 
related angle to this essay‟s topic is to look at how the relative competiveness between the 
Eurozone-countries has developed over time and see if the single monetary policy and 
nominal interest rates have affected countries negative or positive.     
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Appendix A 
 
The ECB has defined price stability for the Euro area in terms of the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP). The main idea of the HICP is to break down the concept into 
individual components in order to identify the different economic factors that contribute and 
have an impact on consumer price development. For example, food prices are divided into 
processed and unprocessed foods, because the prices of the latter are influenced by external 
factors such as weather etc; Please see table 4 for a complete breakdown of the HICP.
52
  
Table 4. Weights of the main euro area HICP components applicable for 2003
53
 
Overall index 100.00 
Goods prices  59.1 
    Unprocessed food  7.6 
    Processed food  11.7 
    Non-energy industrial goods  31.6 
    Energy  8.2 
Services  40.9 
    Housing services  10.4 
    Transport  6.3 
        Communication  2.9 
        Recreation and personal services  14.9 
        Miscellaneous  6.4 
 
The HICP reflects a weighted average between countries in the euro area, depending on the 
variables listed in table 4 above and reflects what we more generally call inflation.  
                                               
52 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 53. 
53 IBID. 
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Appendix B 
For the interested reader, this appendix describes more detailed the technicalities on how the 
ECB carry out its open market operations. Table 5 on following page illustrates a scheme of 
the differences between the open market operations available for the ECB. 
The ECB can use two different groups of operations to conduct the single monetary policy, 
open market operations, and standing facilities. The most commonly used and important 
group of operations is the open market operations. These play an important role in steering 
interest rates, managing the liquidity situation on the market, and signaling the stance of the 
monetary policies. Main refinancing operations (MROs) represent the most important open 
market operation and the lending is carried out through reversed transactions. Reversed 
transactions imply that the ECB buys assets under a repurchase agreement or grants loans 
against assets given as collateral reversed transactions, therefore the reversed transactions are 
temporary and provides funds for a limited period only. The ECB can also manage the 
liquidity situation and fine tune the interest rate level, through fine-tuning operations where 
outright purchases and foreign exchange swaps are possible transactions, but fine-tuning is 
most often carried out by the NCBs.  The structural operations help the ECB, through the 
NCBs, to affect the Euro system‟s structural position against the financial sector. All these 
open market operations are used for different purposes and have different effects on the 
monetary policy.
54,55
 
The purpose of using standing facilities is to restrict and control the volatility of short-term 
interest rates, and the Euro system offers two standing facilities to its counterparties (such as 
banks): marginal lending facility and deposit facility. The standing facilities are managed by 
the decentralized NCBs and the interest rate on the marginal lending facility is normally 
considerably higher than the corresponding market rate, and for the deposit facility the 
interest rate is normally substantially lower than the market rate. This is called a ceiling and a 
floor for the overnight interest rate in the money market and creates a „corridor‟, within which 
the overnight money market interest rate can fluctuate.
56
 
                                               
54 The European Central Bank (2008), The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area: General 
Documentation on Euro system monetary policy instruments and procedures, p. 9 
55 The European Central Bank (2004), The monetary policy of the ECB, p. 75. 
56 IBID, p. 75-76. 
45 
 
Table 5. Euro system open market operations and standing facilities
57
 
Monetary policy 
operations 
Types of transactions Maturity Frequency 
Open  
market  
operations 
Liquidity 
providing 
Liquidity 
absorbing 
  
Main refinancing 
operations 
 Reverse 
transactions 
   ___  One week  Weekly 
Long-term 
refinancing 
operations 
 Reverse 
transactions 
         ___  Three months  Monthly 
Fine-tuning 
operations 
 Reverse 
transactions 
 Foreign 
exchange 
swaps 
 Non-
standardized 
 Non-regular 
 
  Foreign 
exchange 
swaps 
 Collection 
of fixed- 
term 
deposits 
  
  Outright 
purchases 
 Outright 
sales 
  
Structural 
operations 
 Reverse 
transactions 
 Issuance of 
debt 
certificates 
 Standardized/ 
non-
standardized 
 Regular and 
non-regular 
  Outright 
purchases 
 Outright 
sales 
     __  Non-regular 
Standing facilities 
Marginal  
lending  
facility 
 Reverse 
transactions 
    __  Overnight  Access at the 
discretion of 
counterparties 
Deposit facility      __  Deposits  Overnight  Access at the 
discretion of 
counterparties 
 
                                               
57 The European Central Bank (2008), The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area: General 
Documentation on Euro system monetary policy instruments and procedures, table 4.1, p. 73. 
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Appendix C 
Below follows all the data that was processed in order to carry out the analysis and 
comparison on ECB interest rate decisions. Each table represents the available forecasted data 
on output gap and inflation that forms the opinion on the economic development for each 
country and is applicable for the interest rate decisions. For some of the new member 
countries there are no available data in the earlier years. The data in the tables have been 
analyzed and compared with the key interest rates from table 1 at page 21. The tables should 
be interpreted as follows, the interest rate decisions based on the data for each table is 
presented on the table head, the forecasted year is signaled in the left hand column, and which 
European Commission forecast that has been used to collect data is presented above the actual 
figures. The data on output gap and inflation is measured in percent, where output gap is 
relative to potential GDP growth. 
  Interest rate decisions April 28;  June 9 and 28 ; September 1, 2000 use: 
Forecasted  
Year 2001 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2000 Forecast on inflation made spring 2000 
 Austria 0.1 1 
 Belgium 0.6 1.4 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland 1.3 2 
 France 0.5 1.2 
 Germany 0.2 1.6 
 Greece 1.5 2.3 
 Ireland 2.1 3 
 Italy 0.2 1.9 
 Luxemburg 0.8 1.8 
 Malta - - 
 Netherlands 0.8 3.4 
 Portugal 0.3 2.1 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.3 2.2 
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  Interest rate decision October 6, 2000 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2001 Country 
 
Forecast on output gap made autumn 2000 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2000 
 Austria 0.2 1.6 
 Belgium 0.4 1.5 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland 1.9 2.2 
 France 0.4 1.7 
 Germany -0.2 1.7 
 Greece 0.6 2.3 
 Ireland 3.5 3.1 
 Italy -0.1 1.8 
 Luxemburg 1.6 1.9 
 Malta - - 
 Netherlands 1 2.8 
 Portugal 0.3 2.3 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.8 2.2 
    
  Interest rate decisions May 11; August 31; September 18, 2001 use: 
Forecasted 
year 2002 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2001  Forecast on inflation made spring 2001 
 Austria -0.2 1.4 
 Belgium 0.6 1.7 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland 1.6 2 
 France 0.5 1.6 
 Germany 0.1 1.5 
 Greece 1.8 2.3 
 Ireland 2.3 3.6 
 Italy 0.4 1.9 
 Luxemburg 1 1.8 
 Malta - - 
 Netherlands 0.7 2.9 
 Portugal 0.3 2.3 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.5 2.3 
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  Interest rate decision November 9, 2001 use:  
Forecasted 
Year 2003 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2001  Forecast on inflation made autumn 2001 
 Austria 0.1 1.8 
 Belgium 0.1 1.4 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland 0.4 2.2 
 France 0.1 1.5 
 Germany -0.6 1.5 
 Greece 1.4 2.9 
 Ireland 1.5 2.9 
 Italy 0.1 1.8 
 Luxemburg 0.3 1.7 
 Malta - - 
 Netherlands -0.1 2.2 
 Portugal 0.4 1.9 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.4 2.1 
    
  Interest rate decision December 6, 2002 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2004 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2002 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2002 
 Austria -0.5 1.5 
 Belgium 0.1 1.7 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland -0.2 2 
 France 0 1.6 
 Germany -0.7 1.2 
 Greece 1.1 3.3 
 Ireland 0.3 3.1 
 Italy 0 1.9 
 Luxemburg -1.1 1.8 
 Malta  - - 
 Netherlands -0.8 2.4 
 Portugal -0.7 2.5 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.1 2.4 
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  Interest rate decision March 7, 2003 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2004 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2002 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2002 
 Austria -0.5 1.5 
 Belgium 0.1 1.7 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland -0.2 2 
 France 0 1.6 
 Germany -0.7 1.2 
 Greece 1.1 3.3 
 Ireland 0.3 3.1 
 Italy 0 1.9 
 Luxemburg -1.1 1.8 
 Malta  - - 
 Netherlands -0.8 2.4 
 Portugal -0.7 2.5 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0.1 2.4 
    
 
  Interest rate decision June 6, 2003 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2004 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2003 Forecast on inflation made spring 2003 
 Austria 0 1.8 
 Belgium -0.3 1.3 
 Cyprus - - 
 Finland -0.4 1.5 
 France -0.1 1.5 
 Germany -1.1 1.2 
 Greece 1.2 3.5 
 Ireland 0.8 3.2 
 Italy -0.2 1.9 
 Luxemburg -1.5 1.6 
 Malta - - 
 Netherlands -1 1.5 
 Portugal -0.7 2.3 
 Slovakia - - 
 Slovenia - - 
 Spain 0 2.7 
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  Interest rate decision December 6, 2005 use: 
Forecasted 
Year 2007 Country Forecast on output gap  made autumn 2005 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2005 
 Austria -0.9 1.7 
 Belgium -1 1.9 
 Cyprus 0.4 2.1 
 Finland -0.5 1.3 
 France -1 1.9 
 Germany -0.4 1.1 
 Greece 2.2 3 
 Ireland -2.6 2.4 
 Italy -1.2 1.9 
 Luxemburg -1.2 2.2 
 Malta -5.1 2.2 
 Netherlands -1.4 1.9 
 Portugal -2.6 2.2 
 Slovakia 0.2 2.1 
 Slovenia 0.2 2.5 
 Spain -0.5 2.6 
 
    
  Interest rate decision March 8, 2006 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2007 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2005 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2005 
 Austria -0.9 1.7 
 Belgium -1 1.9 
 Cyprus 0.4 2.1 
 Finland -0.5 1.3 
 France -1 1.9 
 Germany -0.4 1.1 
 Greece 2.2 3 
 Ireland -2.6 2.4 
 Italy -1.2 1.9 
 Luxemburg -1.2 2.2 
 Malta -5.1 2.2 
 Netherlands -1.4 1.9 
 Portugal -2.6 2.2 
 Slovakia 0.2 2.1 
 Slovenia 0.2 2.5 
 Spain -0.5 2.6 
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Interest rate decisions June 15; August 9; 
October 11, 2006 use:  
Forecasted 
Year 2007 Country Forecast on output gap  made spring 2006 Forecast on inflation made spring 2006 
 Austria -0.3 1.6 
 Belgium -1 2.1 
 Cyprus 0 2.2 
 Finland -0.4 1.4 
 France -1.3 1.8 
 Germany -0.3 2.3 
 Greece 1.9 3.3 
 Ireland -2.9 2.3 
 Italy -1.4 2 
 Luxemburg -1 3.4 
 Malta -1.6 2.7 
 Netherlands -1 2.1 
 Portugal -2.3 2.4 
 Slovakia 0.2 2.7 
 Slovenia 0.1 2.5 
 Spain -1.5 3.1 
 
    
  Interest rate decision December 13, 2006 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2008 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2006 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2006 
 Austria 0 1.7 
 Belgium -0.7 1.7 
 Cyprus -1.3 2.4 
 Finland -0.2 1.6 
 France -0.9 1.9 
 Germany 0.1 1.2 
 Greece 1.8 3.3 
 Ireland -2.7 2.2 
 Italy -1.1 1.9 
 Luxemburg -0.9 1.8 
 Malta -0.5 2.4 
 Netherlands 0 2.3 
 Portugal -1.5 2.1 
 Slovakia 1.6 2.5 
 Slovenia 0.4 2.6 
 Spain -1.3 2.7 
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  Interest rate decision March 14,  2007 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2008 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2006 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2006 
 Austria 0 1.7 
 Belgium -0.7 1.7 
 Cyprus -1.3 2.4 
 Finland -0.2 1.6 
 France -0.9 1.9 
 Germany 0.1 1.2 
 Greece 1.8 3.3 
 Ireland -2.7 2.2 
 Italy -1.1 1.9 
 Luxemburg -0.9 1.8 
 Malta -0.5 2.4 
 Netherlands 0 2.3 
 Portugal -1.5 2.1 
 Slovakia 1.6 2.5 
 Slovenia 0.4 2.6 
 Spain -1.3 2.7 
    
  Interest rate decision June 13, 2007 use:  
Forecasted 
year 2008 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2007 Forecast on inflation made spring 2007 
 Austria 0.8 1.7 
 Belgium -0.6 1.8 
 Cyprus -0.6 2 
 Finland -0.1 1.7 
 France -0.9 1.7 
 Germany 0.9 1.7 
 Greece 1.6 3.1 
 Ireland -1.6 2.2 
 Italy -0.9 2 
 Luxemburg -0.4 2.7 
 Malta 0.1 2.1 
 Netherlands -0.1 2.1 
 Portugal -1.2 2.3 
 Slovakia 1.8 2.4 
 Slovenia 0.4 2.7 
 Spain -1.3 2.6 
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  Interest rate decision July 9; (October 8, 9) and 15, 2008 use: 
Forecasted  
year 2009 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2008 Forecast on inflation made spring 2008 
 Austria 0.6 1.9 
 Belgium -1 2.3 
 Cyprus -0.6 2.5 
 Finland -0.4 2.3 
 France -0.8 2 
 Germany 0.8 1.8 
 Greece 0.7 3.7 
 Ireland -2 3.6 
 Italy -1.6 2.2 
 Luxemburg -1.3 2.5 
 Malta 0 2.2 
 Netherlands 0.4 2.9 
 Portugal -1 2.3 
 Slovakia 2.5 3.2 
 Slovenia 0.2 3.3 
 Spain -2.1 2.6 
 
  Interest rate decision November 12; December 10, 2008 use: 
Forecasted  
year 2010 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2008 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2008 
 Austria -0.5 1.9 
 Belgium -1.9 2 
 Cyprus -0.4 3.2 
 Finland -1.1 1.8 
 France -1.6 1.7 
 Germany -0.2 1.9 
 Greece 0.2 3.3 
 Ireland -2.9 1.8 
 Italy -1.8 2.1 
 Luxemburg -2.6 2.7 
 Malta -0.1 2.2 
 Netherlands -0.9 2.3 
 Portugal -1.7 2.1 
 Slovakia -0.7 3.3 
 Slovenia -0.6 3.1 
 Spain -3.1 2.8 
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  Interest rate decision January 21; March 11. 2009 use: 
Forecasted 
Year 2010 Country Forecast on output gap made autumn 2008 Forecast on inflation made autumn 2008 
 Austria -0.5 1.9 
 Belgium -1.9 2 
 Cyprus -0.4 3.2 
 Finland -1.1 1.8 
 France -1.6 1.7 
 Germany -0.2 1.9 
 Greece 0.2 3.3 
 Ireland -2.9 1.8 
 Italy -1.8 2.1 
 Luxemburg -2.6 2.7 
 Malta -0.1 2.2 
 Netherlands -0.9 2.3 
 Portugal -1.7 2.1 
 Slovakia -0.7 3.3 
 Slovenia -0.6 3.1 
 Spain -3.1 2.8 
 
  Interest  rate decision April 8; May 13. 2009 use: 
Forecasted 
Year 2010 Country Forecast on output gap made spring 2009 Forecast on inflation made spring 2009 
 Austria -3.3 1.1 
 Belgium -3.8 1.2 
 Cyprus -1.3 2 
 Finland -3.9 1.1 
 France -3.1 0.9 
 Germany -3.7 0.7 
 Greece -2.4 2.3 
 Ireland -8.5 0.4 
 Italy -4 1.8 
 Luxemburg -5.9 2 
 Malta -1.1 1.8 
 Netherlands -3.3 0.9 
 Portugal -3.5 1.7 
 Slovakia -2.2 2.4 
 Slovenia -2.7 2 
 Spain -3.6 1.4 
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58 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/specpub_list12526.htm, Forecasts 2000-2009 
